Normative ethics is one of three main component areas of inquiry
of philosophical ethics, the two others being meta-ethics and applied
ethics. Normative ethics, also known as normative theory, or moral
theory, intends to find out which actions are right and wrong, or which
character traits are good and bad. In contrast, meta-ethics, as the term
suggests, is a study of the nature of ethics. A meta-ethical study
would be concerned, amongst other things, with determining the meaning
and objectivity of moral concepts of right and wrong, or good and bad.
Applied ethics is just the application of normative ethics to particular
issues of practical concern such as abortion, euthanasia, cloning,
animal rights, and criminal punishment, sometimes using the conceptual
tools of meta-ethics as well.
Normative ethics is normative in that they have either moral principles
as standards of right action or virtues as standards of good character
in terms of which right action can be known eventually. There are four
normative theories: 1) Utilitarianism with the principle of utility as
the basic moral principle; 2) Kantianism with the categorical imperative
as the fundamental moral principle; 3) ethical intuitionism (in its
methodological sense) with a plurality of moral principles; and 4)
virtue ethics with virtues as its focus.
Some tension has been noticed between the two different emphases of
normative ethics: action, on the one hand, and virtue, on the other. The
former asks which actions are right, whereas the latter asks which
states of character are morally good. But, the unity of normative ethics
can be explored by understanding that the moral principles of action
and the virtues of character can be known in view of each other at least
to some degree.
Often, the question of where moral rules and virtues in normative ethics
come from is asked. This question is usually addressed in the metaphysical
inquiry of meta-ethics, which, of course, has other kinds of inquiry as
well. While one type of answer says that they are merely human
conventions as in moral relativism, another type holds that these moral
values are eternal truths from beyond our physical world as in Platonic
realism or Medieval philosophy. The latter type often refers to God as
the ground of morality, as in the divine command theory in meta-ethics
today.
Meta-ethics and normative ethics
While applied ethics is important as the practical application of
normative ethics with the use of meta-ethical concepts, normative ethics
and meta-ethics constitue the two main component areas of inquiry in
philosophical ethics. It is helpful to consider the relation between
these two areas of investigation in understanding the concept of
normative ethics.
Meta-ethics
Meta-ethics is an inquiry into the nature of ethics. The prefix meta suggests "aboutness," as, for example, in the word meta-psychology, which is the study of psychology—what it is as a discipline—rather than a study in
psychology. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that a meta-inquiry is a
study of a study. Meta-ethics is then the study of ethics, which is
itself an area of study.
Meta-ethics is concerned with determining the nature of judgments of
moral right or wrong, good and bad. It is not concerned with finding out
which actions or things are right and wrong, or which states are good
and bad, but with understanding the nature and meaning of concepts of
right and wrong, good and bad. Meta-ethics does not ask whether lying is
always wrong. Rather, it tries to ascertain whether there really is
difference between right and wrong, or tries to clarify what it means to
say that an action is right or wrong. A meta-ethical inquiry may ask:
What, if anything, makes a judgment that lying is always wrong, true (or
false)?
Normative ethics
The word normative is an adjective which comes from "norm." In a
philosophical context, the word norm usually means standard, or rule, or
principle, as opposed to what is "normal" for people to do, that is,
what they actually do. For example, the rules of arithmetic are
normative in the philosophical sense, because reasoning can be assessed
against these rules and judged correct or incorrect, irrespective of
whether this usage is the normal usage. If everyone were to calculate
7+5 as 57, they would have made a mistake, for they would have
misunderstood the rules (norms) of arithmetic. So even if this mistake
were "normal," a normative appraisal would hold everyone's actual
thinking to the rule which legislates how they ought to think, and judge
it incorrect.
Normative ethics is concerned with moral norms. A moral norm is a norm
in the sense of being a standard with which moral agents ought to
comply. "Thou shall not murder" is an example of a moral norm: It is
meant to guide our actions, and to the extent that people do not comply,
we may be judged morally—that is, morally blamed. This is then the
meaning of a moral norm.
It is important to bear in mind that when doing normative ethics, one
sets aside meta-ethical concerns about whether there really is a moral
truth and what moral judgments mean, and assumes that there is a
difference between right and wrong, good and bad. Quite independently of
meta-ethical thoughts about whether moral statements (for example,
"Thou shall not kill") are objectively true, normative ethics reasons
about what is right or wrong. This is what John Rawls (1921-2002) means
by the "independence of moral theory." This does not imply, however,
that divergent meta-ethical theories do not have important implications
for the nature of normative ethics at all. Interestingly, these days
scholars such as Stephen Darwall argue that normative ethics should work
together with meta-ethics to be able to answer its own difficult
questions.
Two foci of normative ethics: Action and character
Normative ethics has two central concepts: The right and the morally
good. The concept of the right is, roughly, the concept of duty, the
concept of which actions we ought to perform, which it would be wrong
not to perform. The concept of the morally good, a target of the theory
of value, or axiology (Greek: axios = worth; logos = study
of), refers to morally good properties of human beings. Virtuous
character traits such as kindness, courage, and honesty are examples of
states that are generally thought to be morally good. It is worth noting
here that the term "right" is usually reserved for actions, whereas the
"morally good" is for states of character, including motives. But
normative ethics is interested in both: It is, roughly, the field of
study that aims to determine which actions are right, and which states
of character are morally good.
Which actions are right?
Perhaps the central question of normative ethics involves asking which
actions fall into the category of the right and the category of the
wrong. This is called the theory of right action. The theory of right
action is an investigation and an attempt to answer the question: "What
ought I to do?" The "ought" in this question is to be interpreted as a
moral ought, and may be understood as equivalent to the question: "What
is the right thing to do?" Besides the already mentioned terms, "right,"
"wrong," and "ought," other important normative concepts relating to
action include "obligatory," "forbidden," "permissible," and "required."
So, a normative theory aims to answer the question of "what makes
actions right or wrong." This usually amounts to drawing out basic
principles as standards of right action. These basic principles may be
employed as a moral guide to human beings in their lives, deciding
whether particular courses of action—or particular types of action—are
right or wrong. The principle of utility in utilitarianism, for example,
is a fundamental moral principle according to which right actions are
those that maximize happiness. In Kantianism, the categorical imperative
is such a fundamental principle from which right actions are derived as
duties.
Which states of character are morally good?
The second important focus of normative theory is the question of what
states of character are desirable, or morally good. Here normative
ethics attempts to answer the question: "What sort of person ought I to
be?" This is called the theory of virtue, or virtue ethics. The focus of
this aspect of normative ethics is character. A virtue is a morally
desirable state of character such as courage. So, the theory of virtue
is directed not at what actions one ought to do, but what person one
should be. What is a virtuous person like? What is a vicious person
like? What makes traits of character virtuous or vicious? Important
concepts for the theory of virtue include terms such as good, bad,
virtuous, vicious, honest, courageous, and praiseworthy.
Just as a theory of right action aims to specify which actions are
right, a theory of virtue should specify the virtues, that is, traits of
character it is good or bad to possess. It should say, for example,
that courage is a virtue, and cowardice a vice. It should explain why we
should think of traits like these as virtues or vices. The form of this
justification might be: Courage is a virtue because it tends to bring
benefits to other people. Here again, the state of character is assessed
against a basic normative principle, namely, that it is right to bring
benefits to other people.
Important normative theories
Normative theories are concerned with, broadly, the nature of right
action and the nature of virtue. All normative theories will have
something to say about which actions are right, and which states of
character are virtues. Four normative theories currently exist. These
are utilitarianism, Kantianism, ethical intuitionism (in its
methodological sense), and virtue ethics. If we were to accept the
division of normative theories into teleological and non-teleological
theories, then utilitarianism and virtue ethics would count as
teleological theories, whereas Kantianism and intuitionism as
non-teleological theories (see the article on teleological ethics).
Utilitarianism
Classical utilitarianism says that the right action is that which
produces the greatest balance of overall happiness. By saying that
happiness is the only determinant of the rightness of an action,
classical utilitarianism endorses hedonism as a theory of value.
Utilitarianism has undergone many revisions, but one common move has
been to deny the hedonistic element, and preserve the claim that right
action depends on the best consequences overall in view of the principle
of utility, although the best consequences are not necessarily
understood in terms of happiness but more broadly in terms of valuable
states of affairs. (See the article on consequentialism.)
Kantianism
Kantian ethics stems from the work of the great German philosopher
Immanuel Kant. His work has been tremendously influential and thus the
need to designate a branch of ethics as Kantian, in order to accommodate
the many theories which are broadly influenced by Kant. Kant's own
theory revolves around what he calls the categorical imperative, a moral
principle which he regards as the fundamental principle of morality,
and from which all our duties may be derived. The categorical imperative
is basically a principle of consistency, demanding that we act on
reasons which all rational agents could endorse, that is, universally
acceptable reasons. Kant produces several different versions of the
categorical imperative, and introduces the concept of respect for
persons. The Kantian conception of respect has proved particularly
significant, and here Kant has influenced important contemporary
thinkers such as John Rawls.
Ethical intuitionism
When ethical intuitionism says that we can directly intuit or apprehend
moral principles, it is epistemological and undoubtedly belongs to
meta-ethics. But, ethical intuitionism has another sense in which it can
be considered to be part of normative ethics as it methodologically
refers to unranked pluralism that claims that there are a plurality of
moral principles, and that none of these moral principles is more basic
or important than any other. Ethical intuitionism in this sense is a
normative ethical theory contrasted with versions of monism such as
utilitarianism and Kantianism, which assert that there is only one basic
moral principle: the principle of utility (utilitarianism) or the
categorical imperative (Kantianism). The most well-known theorist in
ethical intuitionism in this sense is probably W.D. Ross (1877-1971),
who is the author of The Right and the Good. According to him,
there are a number of irreducible moral duties (for example, to keep
promises, to refrain from harming the innocent, and so on), none of
which takes precedence over any other. Ross thinks that the right action
in a given situation is determined by a careful weighing of various
moral principles which apply in that situation.
Virtue ethics
The last of the four ethical theories currently under discussion is
virtue ethics. In contrast with the other normative theories which tend
to start with right action, virtue ethics begins with an account of
virtuous character. In other words, virtue ethics offers an account of
what states of character are desirable, or virtues, and then tends to
define right actions in terms of these virtues. For example, virtue
ethics might say that lying is wrong because it is dishonest, or not
what an honest person (virtuous person) would do. (Contrast it with the
utilitarian explanation: Lying is wrong because it tends to bring about
unhappiness). Virtue ethicists, particularly, Aristotle and those who
follow him, argue that right action cannot be understood as conformity
of actions to rules (not even of the prima facie sort suggested by
Ross). They tend to emphasize that the virtuous person is someone who
acts rightly in the situation upon requirements that are unique to the
situation. The virtuous person is someone who is able to perceive what
the situation requires and act accordingly.
Issues on normative ethics
Internal tension within normative ethics
Normative ethics has two different foci it is interested in dealing
with: action and character. The question of action is usually asked by
utilitarianism, Kantianism, and ethical intuitionism in its
methodological sense, and they address it by setting up moral rules and
principles which determine which actions are right. By contrast, the
question of character is handled by virtue ethics, which begins with an
account of virtuous character. There is some tension between both
approaches, which therefore criticize each other sometimes.
Utilitarianism and Kantianism criticize virtue ethics for not being able
to tell what the moral rules and principles should be to give clear
guidance on how to act in specific circumstances. Virtue ethics, in
turn, blames utilitarianism and Kantianism for inflexibly imposing rules
and principles upon all situations without being able to appropriately
accommodate complex circumstances such as abortion, euthanasia, and
cloning where the virtue of wisdom, for example, might be needed case by
case.
One way to help decrease the tension between the two approaches of
normative ethics, is to remind ourselves that virtue ethics, as
originally developed by Plato and Aristotle, is actually grounded in
some absolute standard which could originate rules and principles very
likely. According to Plato, the soul's virtue consists in knowledge of
eternal truth in the Forms, and eudaimonia (happiness or well-being) that results from virtue is rooted in the Form of the Good that pertains to God. For Aristotle, eudaimonia
is the highest good, which, although it is not a transcendent Form at
all, is something perfectly enjoyed in the life of God. So, the above
criticism which virtue ethics receives is not entirely legitimate. It
may be that virtue ethics, as long as it is teleological, intends to
eventually reach moral rules and principles that are grounded in the
Form of the Good or God, although its starting point is the development
of virtues as character traits of the soul. A radical version of virtue
ethics goes even further by ambitiously arguing that moral principles,
if not necessarily considered to be grounded in God, can be defined in
terms of virtuous states of character.
There is another kind of way to help decrease the tension, and it is
from the side of theories of right action such as utilitarianism and
Kantianism. For they may have something to say about which states of
character are virtues in view of some principles. A utilitarian, for
example, may argue that states of character, dispositions, are virtuous,
insofar as they tend to promote happiness. Similarly, a Kantian may
argue that someone of virtuous character will cultivate dispositions
that enable him to do his duty.
The ground of moral values in ethics
Normative ethics is interested in establishing moral principles (to
determine which actions are right) and virtues (to decide which states
of character are morally good). But, the question is: Where do these
moral values (that is, moral principles and virtues) come from? Are they
simply human conventions (as in moral relativism adhered to by
well-known people such as Greek skeptic philosopher Sextus Empiricus,
sixteenth-century French writer Michel de Montaigne, nineteenth century
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche) or eternal truths from some
realm beyond our physical world (as in Platonic realism or Medieval
philosophy)? This metaphysical inquiry is usually not part of the
task of normative ethics. It is rather handled by meta-ethics, which
also deals with epistemological, semantic, and psychological inquiries.
When this metaphysical question is answered by saying that moral values
are eternal truths from some realm beyond our physical world, God is
often referred to as the ground of morality. While theists in religion
undoubtedly agree to refer to God this way, meta-ethics in its
metaphysical inquiry, too, has developed among others a similar option
called the divine command theory, according to which moral values
ultimately depend on an omnipotent and good God. Twentieth-century
philosophical ethicists such as Philip L. Quinn (1940-2004) and Robert
M. Adams (1937- ) defend this theory.
The divine command theory is a theistic response to the atheistic
proposal made by the British analytic philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe
(1919-2001) in her famous 1958 article, "Modern Moral Philosophy," that
there is no lawgiver (God) anyway, so that when theories of right action
are based on moral laws and principles but without a lawgiver, they are
incoherent. According to her, these theories of moral laws should
therefore be abandoned in favor of theories of virtues, which she thinks
are only grounded in eudaimonia and not in God. The divine
command theory is seen as a highly controversial theory in meta-ethics
in the modern and contemporary philosophical climate, thus receiving
many criticisms. One such criticism challenges the acceptability of the
theory by saying that the omnipotent God would capriciously command you
to act criminally. Divine command theorists respond that God's
omnipotence does not mean that he is capable of doing things
contradictory to his morally good nature based on love.