Utility, in a philosophical context, refers to what is good for a human
being. Utilitarianism is a moral theory according to which welfare is
the fundamental human good. Welfare may be understood as referring to
the happiness or well being of individuals. Utilitarianism is most
commonly a theory about the rightness of actions; it is the doctrine
that, from a range of possibilities, the right action is the action
which most increases the welfare of human beings or sentient creatures
in general. Of the many moral theories now called Utilitarian, all share
this claim that morality ought to be concerned with increasing welfare.
Classical utilitarianism has its historical origins in seventeenth
century Britain although its central ideas may be traced back to Plato
and ancient Greek discussions of eudaimonia. The most important
developers and proponents of utilitarianism are Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and, later on, Henry Sidgwick
(1838-1900). In its historical context, utilitarianism aspired to be a
movement of social reform. It was closely tied to its political
aspirations, promoted a new conception of morality which eschewed
references to God and religion, and took morality to be fundamentally an
attempt to bring about as much happiness of pleasure, to achieve the
"greatest good for the greatest number."
Classical utilitarianism may be classified as hedonistic act
consequentialism. This means that classical utilitarianism is a theory
in which the right actions are defined as those bringing about as
consequences the greatest net happiness (or pleasure). Hedonism is no
longer widely embraced as a theory of welfare, but act consequentialism
continues to be influential.
Classical utilitarianism
There are many forms of utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism, ideal
utilitarianism, and preference utilitarianism are but a few examples.
The most well-known form of utilitarianism is also the oldest, classical
utilitarianism, as articulated in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill. Although utilitarianism has been considerably
developed since its earliest presentations, subsequent forms of
utilitarianism may be helpfully understood in terms of their relation to
classical utilitarianism.
Classical utilitarianism may be broken down into two main components: a
theory of value (or the "good"), and a theory of right action. A theory
of value is meant to specify what things (e.g., pleasure or equality)
are valuable or good: These are the things, which we would like to have
promoted or increased in the world. A theory of right action is meant to
specify which actions are right and wrong, or, in other words, provide
action-guiding rules for moral agents.
Classical utilitarianism endorses hedonism as a theory of value.
Hedonism, then, is meant to spell out what is good. A classical
utilitarian would formulate this in terms of utility; quite literally,
utility is that which is useful to human beings. So, hedonism is a
theory of utility (or, in another word, welfare), and utility is offered
as what is valuable or good. Secondly, classical utilitarianism
endorses consequentialism as a theory of correct action. A theory of
correct action specifies what actions moral agents ought to perform; and
consequentialism says that the rightness of an action is determined by
its consequences. This is incipient, if not fully articulate, in Mill’s
formulation of the principle of utility, which he regards as the
fundamental moral principle: "The creed which accepts as the foundation
of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."
Historically, the hedonism of classical utilitarianism has always been
controversial. Many philosophers have rejected hedonism as a theory of
value, without rejecting the insight that morality ought to be concerned
with promoting valuable states of affairs (i.e., consequentialism).
Philosophers have articulated alternative accounts of value, all the
while maintaining the consequentialist element in classical
utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism is an example of
utilitarianism without hedonism, can be seen below. There are, it seems,
an almost countless number of distinct moral theories called
utilitarian, all of which are variations and attempted refinements of
the basic ideas presented by Bentham and Mill.
Hedonism
According to classical utilitarianism, assessing consequences is
exclusively a matter of considering the amount of happiness brought
about by an action. This means that classical utilitarianism endorses
hedonism. Hedonism is the view that happiness is the only intrinsic good
and that unhappiness is the only intrinsic bad. In order to understand
hedonism, therefore, one needs to understand what the classical
utilitarianis meant by happiness as well as grasp the concept of an
intrinsic good.
Happiness is pleasure and an absence of pain
For the Classical Utilitarians, happiness is understood in terms of a
presence of pleasure and an absence of pain. In this they depart from
many ancient Greek discussions of eudaimonia, in which, well being or
flourishing depends on much more than states of pleasure or displeasure.
John Stuart Mill argues this quite clearly, "By happiness is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the
privation of pleasure." The hedonism of classical utilitarianism, then,
understands the human good in terms of qualitative states of pleasure
and pain. But hedonism makes another important claim, which defines it.
It says that happiness is the only intrinsic good.
Intrinsic and instrumental value
An object, experience or state of affairs is intrinsically valuable if
it is good simply because of what it is. Intrinsic value is to be
contrasted with instrumental value. An object, experience, or state of
affairs is instrumentally valuable if it serves as a means to what is
intrinsically valuable. To see this, consider the following example.
Suppose Jack spends his days and nights in an office, working at not
entirely pleasant activities, such as entering data into a computer, and
this, all for money. Someone asks, "why do you want the money?" Jack
answers, "So, I can buy an apartment overlooking the Mediterranean, and a
red Ferrari." This answer expresses the point that money is
instrumentally valuable because it is a means to getting an apartment
and a red Ferrari. The value of making money is dependent on the value
of commodities. It is instrumentally valuable: valuable only because of
what one obtains by means of it.
Happiness is an intrinsic good
Note that an apartment in the Mediterranean and a red Ferrari are not
ends in themselves; they are presumably ends only because Jack believes
that the quality of his life will be improved by having them. The car
and the apartment are not intrinsically valuable at all. They are also
instrumental goods (and so it follows, that one good can be instrumental
to another instrumental good). But where does this chain of
instrumental goods come to an end? The hedonist has a simple and
plausible answer to this. He will say that the chain of instrumental
goods are all directed toward achieving happiness, and that happiness,
therefore, is an intrinsic good.
Suppose Jack is asked why he wants the apartment and the Ferrari. He may
reply that he would be happy if he lived on the Mediterranean and drove
around in fast car. At this point, it seems reasonable to think that
the further question, "and why do you want to be happy?" doesn’t really
make sense. If someone asks this, it seems that such person has not
understood what happiness is. Happiness is not an instrument to any
further good: and this, it is thought, is an indication of an intrinsic
good. When the "why" questions cease to make sense, one has run up
against an intrinsic good. And the why questions run out when the "for
the sake of X" answers run out. Happiness is intrinsically valuable; one
does not want to be happy for any other reason than happiness itself.
Hedonism says that happiness (understood as qualitative states of
pleasure) is intrinsically valuable; and that unhappiness (understood as
qualitative states of pain) is intrinsically bad. But hedonism goes
further than this, and maintains that happiness is the only
intrinsic good. This is important, as almost everyone will admit that
pleasure and pain are important in assessing someone’s welfare. Hedonism
takes this one step further: happiness is the only thing that is
intrinsically good; pleasure and an absence from pain are the only
things good in themselves. John Stuart Mill expresses this point:
"Pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as
ends…all desirable things…are desirable either for [1] the pleasure
inherent in themselves, or as [2] means to the promotion of pleasure and
the prevention of pain."
Bentham's hedonism
Bentham believed any particular pleasure or pain had a determinate
value, which could be measured and compared. He attempted to construct a
scale of comparison and measurement of pain and pleasure. He called
this scale the felicific calculus. He claimed that the value of a
pleasure was to be determined by such factors as its duration and its
intensity. Bentham’s hedonism may be labeled quantitative hedonism,
since all pleasures and pains appear on the same scale, being measured
according to the same set of criteria (such as duration and intensity).
This assumption—all pleasures and pains can, in principle, be subjected
to the same such measurement—entails that all pleasures are ultimately
of the same sort, and that no pleasure is by its very nature superior to
any other. Bentham argues, "The utility of all these arts and sciences,
…the value which they possess, is exactly in proportion to the pleasure
they yield. Every other species of preeminence which may be attempted
to be established among them is altogether fanciful. Prejudice apart,
the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of
music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is
more valuable than either." Bentham’s assumption that all pleasures and
pains can, in principle, be subjected to such measurement entails that
"push-pin may be better than as poetry." Pushpin was a simple child’s
game played at the time, perhaps comparable to tiddlywinks. It all
depends on the amount of pleasure one actually gains from the activity.
Mill's hedonism
Bentham’s hedonism came under fire from some critics, notably Thomas
Carlyle, who called utilitarianism "pig philosophy." One of
Utilitarianism’s most eloquent defenders, John Stuart Mill expresses
Carlyle’s sort of objection as, "To suppose that life has no higher end
than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they
designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of
swine." The objection is that Utilitarianism ignores "higher values."
Mill’s main response to the accusation that utilitarianism is "Pig
Philosophy" is to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures. He
writes: “…some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable
than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other
things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of
pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." Higher
pleasures include pleasures of the human mind: pleasures of the
intellect, imagination, appreciation of beauty, and others. According to
Mill, these higher pleasures are vastly superior to lower pleasures of
the body or "mere sensations." They are different in quality, not just
quantity.
Mill’s hedonism may be labeled qualitative hedonism. The crucial claim
defining qualitative hedonism is that the pleasures of the mind are so
valuable that they can never be counterbalanced in value by any amount
of sensual pleasure. There are discontinuities between pleasures such
that no amount of certain (lower) pleasures can ever be more valuable
for the person who experiences them than some finite amount of certain
(higher) pleasures. This move toward qualitative hedonism allows Mill to
conclude, "It is better (happier) to be a human being dissatisfied than
a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied."
Mill’s qualitative hedonism generates the question of how one decides
which pleasures are more valuable. Mill’s response was to appeal to the
notion of competent judges. "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which
all or almost all who have experienced both give a decided
preference…[it be] the more desirable pleasure." Those who have
knowledge of both kinds of pleasures are the "only competent judges" and
they choose or prefer the higher pleasures. So, for example, in order
to find out whether the pain of hitting one’s finger with a hammer is
worse than the pain of losing one’s lover in death, one must ask someone
who has experienced both. In the same way, to find out whether Mozart
is better than meatballs one must ask people who have experienced both.
In summary, both Mill and Bentham are hedonists. Hedonists make the
claim that happiness (pleasure) is the only intrinsic good. Bentham is a
quantitative hedonist: pleasure is valuable in proportion to the amount
of it that’s produced. Mill is a qualitative hedonist: some experiences
are of a different quality to others. Higher pleasures are of a
different quality and superior in virtue of their kind. Higher pleasures
cannot be compared with any amount of lower pleasures. Hedonism
operates as Utility in classical utilitarianism.
Criticisms of hedonism
One of the most well known objections to hedonism derives from a thought
experiment devised by Robert Nozick. The thought experiment of "The
Experience Machine" runs as follows: "Suppose there were an experience
machine that would give you any experience you desired. Super-duper
neuro-psychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think
and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading
an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with
electrodes attached to your brain. Would you plug in? What else can
matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?"
The experience machine is meant to be an argument against hedonism. If
hedonism were correct, then people would want to plug into the
"Experience Machine." This is because the experience machine can
guarantee more pleasure than one would have in real life. Nozick thinks
that people do not really want to plug into the "Experience Machine."
Therefore, hedonism is not correct. If hedonism were correct, then, by
the definition of hedonism, the only thing people value, ultimately, is
happiness or pleasure. The conclusion of Nozick’s argument then says
that people do, as a matter of fact, value things besides our own
happiness; the fact that people are reluctant to plug in means that at
the very least, humanity values the truthfulness of its experiences.
Some Utilitarians, who agree that the experience machine defeats
hedonism, have argued that what is good is not happiness, understood as
pleasure, but the satisfaction of desires or preferences. This is meant
to accommodate an insight from the experience machine, namely that it
seems to matter whether one’s desires are really satisfied, or only
appear to be satisfied. What matters is really (e.g.) having a friend,
or writing a good book, rather that believing that one has a friend or
has written a good book. This form of utilitarianism, which understands
Utility in terms of the satisfaction of people’s desires or preferences,
is usually called preference utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism
not without its problems, and many variations, have been proposed and
refined, and some of the proposals are quite technical. For the purposes
of this article, it is sufficient to note one key distinction between
theories of value. This is the distinction between subjectivist and
objectivist accounts of value.
Subjectivist accounts tie value to the conscious states of sentient
beings, whereas objective accounts maintain that something may be good
or bad for a human being even if he or she does not know about this
putative good. Hedonism and preference satisfaction theories are
subjectivist since they tie what is valuable to the states of
consciousness, desires, and needs of sentient creatures. By contrast,
objectivist theories say that some things are good or bad for people,
independently of whether they know about them, or desire them. Suppose
for example, an imaginary world (perhaps along the lines of Aldous
Huxley’s Brave New World) in which everyone is brainwashed so
that they are neither free, nor desire to be free. An objectivist theory
of value might say that in this case, freedom is something objectively
good, even though no one desires it.
G.E. Moore’s (1903) ideal utilitarianism recognizes (amongst
others) beauty, truth, and pleasure as intrinsic goods, and may be
regarded as a pluralist theory, because it includes subjective and
objective goods.
Consequentialism
As already mentioned, no particular account of utility is essential to
utilitarianism. However, consequentialism is essential to any theory
under the utilitarianism banner. Utilitarianism is one species of
consequentialism. Although this terminology is not absolutely standard,
most theorists identify utilitarianism as consequentialism with a
subjectivist account of value. In this respect, consequentialist
theories which endorse theories of value that are not centrally
concerned with individual welfare, such as perfectionist or
eudaimonistic consequentialism, are not usually thought of as
utilitarian theories. The rationale for doing so is presumably to
emphasize the link between the utility, the useful, and human desires.
By contrast, it is a central claim in perfectionism that a state can be
valuable for an agent even it does not affect that person's happiness. A
consequentialist theory with a perfectionist theory of value would not
therefore be called perfectionist Utilitarianism. (It is worth noting
that calling G.E. Moore's "Ideal" Utilitarianism is misleading, at least
according to those theorists who want to keep the term Utilitarianism
for theories with subjectivist accounts of value.)
Consequentialism is, basically, the idea that the moral rightness of,
for example, an action is determined in terms of the value of its
consequences, in terms of the goodness (or badness) brought into
existence. So, for example, hedonistic act consequentialism (classical
utilitarianism) defines the right action in terms of the value of the
consequences brought about, where value is to be understood in terms of
pleasure and absence from pain. But this is not yet enough to accurately
characterize classical utilitarianism.
Firstly, who are the recipients of the increase in non-moral value
necessary for right action? According to Jeremy Bentham, the utilitarian
is required to be impartial and to count everyone’s interests equally
and can be seen in his slogan, "Everybody [is to] to count for one and
nobody for more than one." When it comes to other teleological and
consequentialist moral theory, namely ethical egoism, an action is right
if it promotes an increase in happiness for the agent him or her self.
Right action is entirely self-interested action. Ethical Egoism is
therefore, strictly speaking, a consequentialist moral theory, even a
hedonistic consequentialist theory. What differentiates ethical egoism
from classical utilitarianism is that classical utilitarianism requires
that the actor be entirely impartial; everyone’s interests are taken
into consideration equally.
So classical utilitarianism says that the rightness of an action is
determined by the value of the consequences brought about by the action,
and also, that one is required to be impartial in tallying up the value
of the consequences. Everyone’s interests are to be counted equally in
the utility calculation. But how much utility is one required to bring
about? Suppose that, of the actions available to the agent, all will
increase the value in the world, i.e., bring about some increase in
goodness, but some will do so more than others. Employing something like
Bentham’s felicific calculus, assume that action A produces 20 units of
happiness whereas action B only 15. Which action is one required to do,
according to the classical utilitarian?
According to classical utilitarianism one must bring about the most
possible happiness overall. It is not good enough to bring about some
increase in happiness; rather, one is required to do one’s best. So if
one performed action B and only produced 15 units of happiness, then
that person would not have done his or her duty. Because classical
utilitarianism requires people to do the very best action available, it
may be called maximizing consequentialism. Calculating happiness is a
matter of weighing each person's happiness equally, and also maximizing
overall happiness (I.e. aggregate utility).
Objections to consequentialism
Justification and deliberation
A normative theory such as consequentialism aims to answer the question,
"what makes actions right or wrong?" A related aim of normative theory
is to provide principles of right action that may be employed as a moral
guide to human beings in their lives. But this generates a problem. The
objection goes back to Mill's utilitarianism, and it is this: "There is
not enough time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing any
line of conduct on the general happiness." To see the problem, consider
that the Principle of Utility is a fundamental moral principle according
to which right actions are those that maximize happiness. This is an
account of which actions are right and which are wrong in terms of a
basic moral principle. But if moral theories are meant to provide
guidance for human conduct on the basis of particular rules, then the
Principle of Utility does not seem to be very well suited to this. For
it would seem to be self defeating to use the Principle of Utility as a
decision procedure since by using it one would probably be prevented
from actually bringing about the best action. Consider an example when
someone has to act quickly in order to save another person from
drowning. If he or she had to use the Principle of Utility to calculate
whether (e.g.) jumping into the ocean was indeed the right thing, the
opportunity of saving the life would be lost, and he or she would end up
not having done the right thing. So, the objection says that
Utilitarianism fails as a moral theory because it does not provide a
rule which can actually be used by people to guide their own conduct.
Mill’s reply to this objection says that the "…there has been ample
time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species." Ordinary
morality may then be used as rules of thumb, guidelines that will help
in navigating through daily life. This is important because it opens up a
gap between how one ought to think in contexts of moral deliberation,
and those properties of individual acts, which confer rightness or
wrongness on the action. If the principle of utility is a criterion of
rightness, and not a decision procedure, then utilitarianism does not
entail that one ought (always) to try to calculate the greatest utility
of one’s action. It will often be better to act in accordance with
common sense moral rules rather than trying to calculate the expected
outcome of one’s action.
Conflicts with ordinary morality
Utilitarianism is in conflict with ordinary moral thinking in a number
of ways. This is because Utilitarianism is a form of act
consequentialism, and act consequentialim conflicts with ordinary moral
thinking.
Firstly, it seems that consequentialism is unable to accommodate justice
and rights. One well known case of this problem with consequentialism
is that of a sheriff who frames and executes an innocent man in order to
prevent a riot in which many innocent people would certainly be killed.
Since the sheriff brings about more good consequences than bad
consequences by framing the innocent man, consequentialism says that
this is the right action to perform. However, an innocent man does not
deserve to be punished. So, it seems, consequentialism does not
accommodate justice. Since consequentialism is one necessary component
in utilitarianism, it seems that utilitarianism does not accommodate
rights.
A structurally very similar problem arises with respect to
consequentialism and rights. The concept of a "right" has to do with
protecting a person’s important interests. Rights place limits on how an
individual may be treated; they are basic constraints which set limits
on what may be done to persons. Once again the problem is that a
utilitarian moral theory is apparently committed to the claim that
nothing that is ultimately prohibited, so long as the good consequences
of this action outweigh the bad. Rape, torture, and all manner of
horrific acts may in principle be required whenever the overall
consequences are good enough. This clashes with the idea that persons
have rights which limit what may be done to them, even in the pursuit of
good consequences.
Another problem for utilitarianism is accounting for the existence of
special ties of obligation. Special obligations include those acquired
by entering into contracts, occupying a certain occupational role, and
family ties. For example, a teacher is obligated to certain sorts of
actions related to satisfying occupational duties, and these actions are
required of him or her only because of the special duties incumbent on a
teacher. Similarly, a mother or father is usually thought to be
obligated to her or his children in a way she or he is not obligated to
other people’s children. These are sometime called agent-relative
duties. The trouble is that utilitarianism requires strict impartiality
in the calculation of consequences, (it is therefore, an agent neutral
moral theory) and so, one is obligated to bring about good for those who
would benefit from it most, irrespective of their relationship to
oneself. This consequence is at odds with ordinary thinking in that it
seems that a person reasonably displays concern for her family that she
does not display for others. But utilitarianism requires one to promote
the good in general, and does therefore not accommodate the common sense
intuition that special obligations generate special duties, and that
(e.g.) a father is required to do things for his own family that he is
not required to do for people in general.
On a closely related point, W.D. Ross has argued that if breaking a
promise brings about slightly more happiness, then the classical
Utilitarian must prescribe that the promise is to be broken. Imagine
that Jack made a promise to give John a ride to the airport. However, at
the last moment Jill asks Jack to go away for the weekend, making it
impossible to give John the ride. Imagine that there would be a slightly
greater balance of gain if Jack went on the weekend get-away: Jack
really is a bundle of fun, and the happiness he brings about on the trip
slightly outweighs John's irritation over the broken promise. Ross’s
point is that utilitarianism says Jack should break his promise even if
the gain is only slightly more. But this seems to imply that
utilitarianism cannot accommodate the point that one is obligated by the
promise, and a slight gain in overall pleasure does not seem to trump
this obligation.
Another important objection to utilitarianism is that it is too
demanding as a moral theory. To understand this objection, it is
necessary to spend a moment considering some key features of common
moral beliefs. In ordinary morality, there is a distinction between what
people are morally required to do (or not do) and what is good or
morally significant to do, but what is not strictly required. For
example, "Thou shall not murder" entails that people are required to
refrain from intentionally killing innocent people. By contrast, acts of
charity are morally praiseworthy, but people are not, it is usually
thought, strictly required to be charitable. Rather, charity is
something that goes beyond the bounds of duty. One would not normally be
blamed for failing to give to charity, although one would be morally
praised for so doing. Actions that are morally admirable to do but not
strictly required are called supererogatory actions.
The problem for utilitarianism is that it eliminates the distinction
between actions that are morally required and morally supererogatory
actions and so it is at odds with ordinary moral thinking. The
utilitarian criterion for right action is maximization of a specified
value: one is doing the right thing only insofar as one is maximizing
the good. However, people often take themselves to be acting in a way
that is morally permissible even when it clearly is not one which brings
about the most good. Spending money on a holiday, for example, seems to
be a candidate for a morally permissible action although there are
other courses of action that would serve a much greater good overall.
For instance, giving the money to an agency like the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) may help to save lives, a much greater good
than a few days spent lazing about on a beach. If people are doing the
right thing only when maximizing the good, it seems that almost all
actions are wrong. Critics contend that this entails that utilitarianism
is too demanding as a moral theory. It does not seem right to say that
one is doing wrong by going out for dinner on Friday night, or sitting
around chatting with friends.
Utilitarian replies to objections
Revisionism
Some hard line utilitarians argue that moral common sense is mistaken
and ought to be revised. The conflict between the prescriptions of a
moral theory and the ordinary way of thinking raises a question about
how moral theories are to be evaluated. If a moral theory conflicts with
commonsense, pre-reflective morality, it could be that the theory is
wrong or contemporary moral convictions are wrong (or both). Does one
revise his or her practices or morality to accord with the theory? Or do
people reject the theory, and try to find another one that fits better
with popular moral convictions? Hard-line utilitarians argue that
utilitarianism, as a moral theory, ought to be upheld over our common
moral intuitions. We ought to prefer the theory to intuitive judgments
expressive of commonsense morality. Smart expresses this view as,
"Admittedly utilitarianism does have consequences which are incompatible
with the common moral consciousness, but I tended to take the view 'so
much the worse for the common moral consciousness.' That is, I was
inclined to reject the common methodology of testing general ethical
principles by seeing how they square with our feelings in particular
instances."
This sort of hard line commitment to the revision of moral practices is
probably not the most popular response taken by contemporary
utilitarians. Most philosophers are uncomfortable with a large-scale
revisionism of moral practices as a result of a moral theory. As a
result, they attempt to modify the theory to bring it closer to ordinary
moral thinking on certain key matters. The philosophical literature on
utilitarianism and, more specifically, consequentialism is enormous,
proliferating with attempts to avoid the problems outlined above, and
others, and bring utilitarianism more into line with moral common sense.
Rule utilitarianism
One common move in bringing utilitarianism more in line with ordinary
moral thinking is to specify the relation between consequences and right
action indirectly. Classical utilitarianism defines rightness directly.
An act is right if and only if it increases aggregate happiness.
Classical utilitarianism is therefore a version of direct act
consequentialism. Direct act consequentialism says that the moral
rightness of an action depends on the consequences of that very action.
By contrast, indirect act consequentialism says that the moral rightness
of an act depends on the consequences of something else, such as
motives or rules.
One influential form of indirect consequentialism is rule utilitarianism.
According to rule utilitarianism, the moral rightness of an act depends
on its conformity with a rule, which itself is justified because it
produces the best consequences overall. So rule utilitarianism endorses
rule consequentialism. Rule consequentialism defines right action
indirectly in terms of rules that tend to promote the non-moral good. In
order to ascertain whether an action is right, one has to take into
account the consequences of following the rule against which the action
is assessed. In this respect, rule utilitarianism is indirect act
consequentialism because it makes the rightness of an action dependent
on the results of following a rule, rather than the action itself. A
right action is one which conforms to a rule, which is justified because
the consequences of following this rule are better than the
consequences of following alternative rules.
Rule utilitarianism seems to be able to answer the objections from
rights and justice outlined above. With respect to the scenario in which
an innocent man is framed in order to prevent a riot, a rule
Utilitarian will reason that a society in which people adhere to the
rule, "don’t punish the innocent" is bound to be better that a society
in which this rule is not followed. The rule, "don’t punish the
innocent" produces greater overall good. Punishing the innocent man is
wrong because it does not accord with the rule which would bring about
the best consequences overall. Secondly, the rule utilitarian may
accommodate intuitions about special obligations by arguing that the
consequences of following these sorts of rules will tend to be better
than those generated by not adhering to agent relative duties. It seems
reasonable to think that rule utilitarianism will generate moral
prescriptions quite closely in accordance with those of common sense.